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Always Turning the Other Cheek? 
- An Introduction to the Question ‘Christianity and Resistance’ 
 
 
Søren Dosenrode 
Kaj Munk Research Centre 
Aalborg University 
 
 
 
Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. 
For there is no power but of God: the powers that be are 
ordained by God. Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, 
resisteth the ordinance of God[…] 
Rom. XIII, 1-2 
 
John Locke argues in his ‘The Second Treaties of Government’ that a state is necessary to avoid the 
total anarchy and a ‘state of nature’ where all fight all (chapters II & III), and thus he is in 
accordance with both with Aristotle who argues that it is the task of the state to secure stability for 
its citizens (‘Politik’, Book 5), and with Hobbes, who described the world outside the state with  his 
famous words: ‘It is a jungle out there’ . The state prevents that anarchy should move inside the 
state boarders, it gives stability and peace. Resistance to the state’s orders is basically an action no 
state can tolerate, as it undermines the executive’s authority and may lead to the loss of the states 
legitimacy, to anarchy and eventually to the break down of the state. And man long for pace and 
stability not anarchy, but at any cost, is there a limit when resistance against the state is necessary? 
 
The topic of this short chapter, indeed this whole book is resistance understood as the opposition to 
something one disagrees with, concretely ‘the state’. Resistance may be legal or illegal; it may be 
passive or active. But if all governance comes from God are Christians allowed to resist any 
Government  at all?1 This question has been answered differently by different persons at different 
times in different situations, and it not the aim of this chapter to give an answer to the question. But 
whatever the answer may have been, through the ages, it has had political, moral and some times 
personal consequences.  
 
The aims of this chapter is not to give a narrative of church history, but to look at the concept of 
resistance from a theological and a politological / philosophical angle. We will focus on three 
central periods: the formative years of the Church (30 AD until around 500), the 16th and 17th 
                                                 
1 Although relevant and interesting, this book does not look at Christians oppressing other Christians out of religious 
disagreements even though the former may be in government; thus ‘incidents’ like the prosecution of the Anabaptists by 
the Zwinglianer in Zurich will not be looked into. 
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century (including the Reformation), when the doctrines were conceived and developed by clergy as 
well as politologists, and the end of the 18th century, where the ancienne regime was overthrown, 
and a legitimating for that was needed. These were the crucial periods, where the concept was 
developed; the later times basically draw on the earlier thinkers. 
 
The beginning 
 
During the first century AD Christianity began spreading within the Roman Empire which was 
approaching the zenith of its power building on Augustus victory over Antonius. Augustus 
reformed the religious system of Rome emphasising the ancient Roman gods and traditions, 
restoring temples, rites etc. and trying to stop the infiltration of the Oriental gods, sceptical 
philosophy and atheism, which were considered dangerous to the state, the regime. His reform 
secured a certain stability over the next 200 years (Grane 173/22). One important factor in this 
context was the worship of the emperor, beginning with the worship of his genius but soon, under 
Caligula, one worshiped not only the genius and the deceased emperors but the living ones as well 
(‘Caesar and god’). In the meantime the Church itself expanded; Acts as well as the Letters in the 
New Testament give a vivid account of that. The two most important factors being Paul’s opening 
of Christianity to non-Jews and the destruction of Jerusalem in 70 AC  moving the centre of the 
Church from a small provincial town to Rome and Ephesus, conducting a final breach with Judaism 
and at the same time placing itself centrally in the Empire. Apart from Nero’s rather local 
persecution in Rome (64 AD) there were no conflict between the state and the Christians2. 
Augustus’ death (14 AD) had implied a climate of larger tolerance towards other religions which 
the Christians could profit from when they began spreading some decades later. Adding to this, the 
Christians constituted a minority and were not considered a threat to the Roman state or its religion. 
But this did not prevent local episodes, as Christianity was itself intolerant towards other religions, 
claiming to be the only true way to salvation – Acts tell several episodes where Christians were 
persecuted locally (13,59; 14;1-6; 14,19). But generally the period was tranquil for the new Church 
which respected the Emperor and his officials; they lived in the World but tried not to be of the 
world. 
 
During the second century the Roman Empire expands and consolidates under the leadership of the 
adopted emperors (e.g. Trajan, Hadrian and Marcus Aurelius). The state is strong and not 
threatened, culture flourishes, one speaks of ‘the golden century’. But this does not imply that 
Christianity is an accepted religion, it is illegal and not looked at with tolerance, neither from the 
other religions nor from the state. But a correspondence from Emperor Trajan to the governor in 
Asia Minor, Plinius the Younger from approx. 112 reveals, that although the emperor considers 
Christians worthy of the death-penalty, they are too unimportant for the state to begin investigations 
to eliminate them on a larger scale (Bruce1991/14-19). The Church itself expanded slowly during 
this century, perhaps due to the hostile environment.     
 
The end of the second century and all of the third century were bad for the Roman empire. After 
Marcus Aurelius came the rule of Commodus, initiating a period of unrest lasting under the house 
of Septimus Servus (193-235) and the soldier emperors which – with the exeption of Diocletian – 
lasted until Constantinus the great. The state was weakened inside by many and incompetent 
Emperors and civil wars, as well as a steady building pressure from outside which had been there 
since the mid-second century.  
                                                 
2 Although two prominent Christians, St. Peter and St. Paul were killed. 
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According to Latourette (1965 / chapter 4) the problems Rome had in this period were interpreted 
by some as a result of the apostete from the old gods, as well as the upcoming of the Christians. 
While accepting the rule of the Emperor and even praying for him, the Christians could not worship 
him or the ancient Roman gods, and as the emperor was seen both as the personification of the state 
and as a god, it was easy to argue for the Christians as at best illoyal and at worst blasphemic 
heathens disregarding the old gods etc. When adding to this the Christian claim of exclusive 
knowledge of salvation, the scene was set for prosecutions and they came.  
 
The Church itself ran through a strong development in this period. At the beginning it was 
weakened by internal disagreements and syncretism (Gnosis, Markion, Montanusis) but it is 
possible to claim, that this internal threat was overcome around 180 as one also agreed on the canon 
as well as the rules for baptism. At the organisational level the bishops were able to strengthen their 
position (apostolic succession), organise cooperation between the dioceses (Synods) etc. But this 
also made the Church more visible and slowly more powerful. Septimus Servus forbad conversion 
to Christianity, and Emperor Decius trying to renew the Roman spirit dictated that all Roman 
citizens should offer up to the Roman gods. According to Grane (1973/66) did this lead to the first 
organised prosecution (250-251) but did not cost many martyrs but many lapsi. Under any 
circumstances the Church was better prepared when Emperor Valerianus’ prosecutions began in 
257. Christian services were prohibited, the clergy were ordered to sacrifice to the gods and 
senators and knights were threatened with confiscation of their property (Grane 1973/67). The latter 
is interesting, as it implies that also members of the Roman upper-classes were now turning towards 
Christianity. When Emperor Gallienus stopped the prosecutions the Church got around 40 years of 
peace which it used to consolidate itself until the last and worst prosecution was launched by 
Emperor Diocletian 303-304 lasting until 311. According to Robert Broughton (1966 / 199) did 
Diocletian considered the Church a powerful organisation, a state in the state, what he could not 
tolerate in a time of crisis. His prosecution hat two phases;  first the civil service and the army was 
cleansed for Christians (to secure a loyal instrument for the following process), then the Christians 
had to sacrifice to the gods; either that or deportation to the mines … The prosecutions lasted until 
311 when Emperor Galerius stopped them.  
 
Concerning resistance the Church began as a tiny, fragile organisation which lived on the mercy of 
its environment. It was discriminated against from the state and parts of the civil society. And the 
Church, especially at the beginning, hardly had influential supporters. The Christians rendered 
passive resistance to the state and no other real alternative was left to it, neither do I recall having 
read suggestions of the opposite. Martyrdom was a reality, and a way to meet the Lord. In this 
sense, the choice was easy. Besides there was no Roman tradition to fall back on, should one have 
considered the idea3.  
 
After Diocletian’s resignment 305 war broke out among his designated successsors. This civil war 
had a first end with Emperor Constantine the Great’s (c. 208 - 337) victory over his rival Maxentius 
at the Milvia Bridge4 312, which makes Constantine  ruler of the Western Empire, while Licinius 
rules the East until Constantine’s victory over him in 324. But the Roman empire had suffered from 
the civil war. In 330 Constantine founded Constantinople, ‘a new Rome’, thus moving the centre of 
                                                 
3 In the republic a roman civil servant could be tried before court after he had laid down his office; and during the 
emperors’ era, they hard a divine aura preventing resistance – but not assassination of political reasons. 
4 Legend tells that on the evening of the battle at Milvia Bridge (near to Rome), a cross appeared in the sky together 
with the words ’by this sigh shall you conquer’, turning Constantine favourably towards Christianity. 
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the Empire eastwards. Constantine and his succeeders were preoccupied with wars against Persia, 
the Franks, the Goths etc. Emperor Theodosius kept the Empire together until his death in 395, 
where it was divided between his two sons. The last western Emperor was Romolus Augustulus 
(476), whereas the eastern Empire went on until 1453. 
 
Already 313 Constantine gave the Edict of Tolerance (Edict of Milan), in which the Church got 
official toleration, got its properties restored, and the bishops got a certain degree of jurisdiction. 
The change had come for the Church, a change which was finally crowned by its elevation to state-
church in 380 at the same time as other religions were prohibited. In other words, the political 
situation of the Church was dramatically changed. 
 
The prise the Church had to pay was a loss of independence. Constantine needed the Church to 
legitimize his empire, and thus he needed a united church. So when the Church was faced with 
internal fights he would intervene, either with direct orders or by calling an ecumenical council as 
he did in Nicaea 325 to solve the Arian conflict and to formulate Christian doctrine; works he 
himself participated in.   
 
The questions of resistance, military service and war were not serious questions before 313. But 
afterwards some of these questioned popped up, now that the Church and the State were in close 
alliance.  Augustine (354-430 AD), in his de civitate dei as well as in his letters does not directly set 
up a doctrine on the right of resistance, he does discuss reasons for war, and if one follows Home it 
is also possible to deduce a certain right of resistance. According to Augustine one may conduct 
war according to the will of God (Book 1.21) e.g. against the heathens attacking (2001 /.221), but it 
should be just (Book 15,4) and its aim should be peace (Book 19, 12). He also writes a Christian 
senior officer (2001 / 217):”Therefore it ought to be necessity, and not your will, that destroys an 
enemy who is fighting you. And just as you use force against the rebel or opponent, so you ought 
now to use mercy towards the defeated or the captive, and particular so when there is no fear that 
peace will be disturbed”. Augustine also nailed down the criteria of a just war (bellum justum):  
 
1) it’s aim must be the re-creation of the legal order i.e. peace with the adversary, not the 
destruction of him (recta intentio).   
2) Just war my only by waged by a (legitimate) government, to him: the Roman emperor (legitima 
auctoritas). And  
3) the course of the war must be the threat of breaking the legal order (causa iusta).  
 
Home (without year) argues, that according to Augustine, God’s state will remain in a state of 
contradiction to the earthly state (civitas terrene), only with the Church as a vague mirror of God’s 
states glory, and thus the Christians, to save the eternal life are allowed to resist the earthly powers. 
 
Taking a large step forward in time Thomas Aquinas (1225 – 1274) treated the question of 
‘tyrannicide’5.  The 13th century witnesses the many wars between France and England, the 
Emperor and the Pope etc. The Pope tries to claim his superiority over the Emperor as well as the 
king of France. The Empire gets weakened and consists of a multitude of principalities, all 
organised in a feudal way. Thus the question of resistance is more than just theoretical. Thomas 
                                                 
5 Tyrannicide must be understood as the ultimate kind of active resistance. Other kinds of resistance was known and 
accepted as common law through the middle ages, as long as they did not exceed the boundaries of proportionality: e.g. 
refusal of showing obedience (Wilhelm Tell), refusal of paying taxes, doing drudgery. This was done to restore rights 
and of course it was easier for a nobleman than a peasant to do this. 
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Aquinas approved of it. The tyrant is (cf. Harty): “[…] a traitor acting against the common well, 
and, like any other criminal, may be put to death by legitimate authority. If possible the legitimate 
authority must use the ordinary forms of law in condemning the tyrant to death, but if this is not 
possible, it can proceed informally and grant individuals a mandate to inflict the capital 
punishment.” The word ‘grant’ is important, as it implies, the killer must have a mandate, not do it 
on his or her own whim. According the same source, Thomas Aquinas accepted tyrannicide as a last 
resort, but also rooted in a higher power than an individual’s idea. This is in accordance with the 
medieval understanding that government comes from God, carried out by people to the benefit of 
men. It is also in accordance with the Augustinan dictum of violence must only be used to restore 
peace and justice. This same understanding of use of violence comes through when looking at his 
understanding of (just) war which is equivalent to Augustinus’: 
 
1) Only governments had the right to declare war (legitima potestas) 
2) Ther had to be a just reason for war (causa iusta) 
3) There had to be a will to re-construct justice (recta intentio). 
 
According to Thomas Aquinas is war of aggression not allowed6.  
 
The Reformation and the theologians thought of Resistance 
  
The Catholic Church discussed the question of tyrannicide at the Council of Constance (1414-18) 
under the direction of the Emperor, and came out against it, condemning it as contrary to faith and 
moral. The Council was important, as it attempted to restore the Church after the Popes were in 
Avignon and the general decay of the Church’s power, morally and politically (at time there were 
two Popes, bribery etc.). 
 
A good hundred years later, the Reformation swept Europe, and the new Churches had to make a 
stand on the question, too in that extremely tense and uncertain time; tense and uncertain for the 
churches and for the peoples. The Constancer Council had not solved the moral crisis of the Church. 
Although Emperor Charles V fought both for the Church and the Empire, he was not able to prevent 
the disintegration of the Empire, esp. in Central Europe nor the continuing moral decay of the 
Church, eventually leading to the Reformation.  
 
As mentioned the Catholic Church did not approve of resistance. This would also be inconsistent, as 
the Pope still claimed to have the right to tell a prince if he behaved rightly or not as he had done 
earlier e.g. King Henry of Germany’s walk to Canossa 1076. Still there were theologians within the 
Catholic Church who discussed the right of resistance like the Spanish Jesuite Mariana  (1599), 
coming out in favour of it. 
 
Martin Luther (1483 - 1546) may look ‘woolly’ in his approach to resistance, and he had witnessed 
the ‘German Peasant’s War’ (Bauernkrieg). The peasants, in a miserable economic and social 
situation, had witnessed the behaviour of the clergy of the Catholic Church  and had been able to 
read the newly translated New Testament (1522) and Martin Luther’s ‘On the freedom of a 
Christian man’, Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen’ (1520). These books inspired them to 
ask, why they had to work for the upper classes. The result was violent uprisings, the slaughter of 
                                                 
6 I have included the question of just war be course it shows the great restraint both Augustinus and Thomas Aquinas 
lied down on the use of violence, be that from the side of the state or the citizens. Violence was ultima ratio. 
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many peasants, and the endangerment of Luther’s reformation due to the princes misbelieve or fear 
of the consequences. But when looking in his ‘Tischreden’ he is fairly clear (1953/197, my 
translation): 
 
“May one kill a tyrant, who acts against law and equity ? 
 
For a civilian or a common man, who holds no public office or command, it is not suitable, that he 
should do it [kill a tyrant, SD], even if he could – the fifth commandment prohibits it: You must not 
murder. But if I should find a man with my wife or my daughter, even if he was not a tyrant, I 
would kill him. Therefore: If he takes the wife of this one, the daughter of the other one, and the 
land and possessions of a third one, and if the subjects then unite in order to put an end to his 
violence and tyranny, they shall kill him like any other murderer or robber”  
 
But then (1953/197p., my translation) 
 
“Example of steadiness 
 
If the authorities themselves are hostile and against God’s word, we yield, sell and leave everything, 
flee from one city to the other, as Christ commands: For because of the gospel, one should not make 
noise nor make opposition, but suffer everything.” 
     
In other words, I find Luther fairly clear: when considering the general problem he accepts the right 
to resistance, if the subjects in globo decide so. But in accordance with Aquinas he advises a single 
individual to use the jus emigrandi if prosecuted. 
 
Jean Calvin (1509 – 1564) was very clear in his teachings. Leaning on Augustine and Thomas 
Aquinas he emphasised the state’s authority over man: In a fallen world the state is necessary to 
keep order and justice. Thus there is no individual right of resistance. But as Iain Maclean rightly 
remarks does Calvin’s emphasise of God’s absoluteness open up for organised resistance, when the 
ruler’s commands are in conflict with God’s word. No state is absolute, only God is. In ‘The 
Institutes of the Christian Religion’, Book 4 ‘On the Duty of Magistrates’ Calvin stresses that that 
removing of a ruler, who is not in accordance with God, is a duty of the magistrate or other lower 
institutions. It is not a right of individuals or groups of citizens. Calvin very much wanted to prevent 
anarchy. 
 
 
Text …. 
 
 
 
The Anabaptists have their origin in the Zwinglian reformation in Zürich (1525), which they 
basically supported but did not find excessive enough.  In the ‘Schleitheimer Article’ from 1527 
they lied down their basic dogmatic: The non-recognition of child baptism, the non-recognition of 
earthly authorities, the refusal of paying tax, doing military service, and take the oath. Adding to 
this thy formed their own congregations. Their dogmatic fundament was the Sermon on the Mount. 
They belong to the founders of the pacifist tradition. Resistance, which inevitably would happen, 
was logically of passive nature. 
 
 6
These basic positions have been held by the four churches up through the centuries, but they have 
developed according to the surrounding society. During the reformation the Reformed and the 
Protestant Churches turned more open to resistance, to defend the right faith, when they were 
threatened, and the Catholic Church kept its strong point of ‘no resistance’. Concurrently with the 
end of the religious wars in Europe, the upcoming of the modern state system (Westphalian Peace 
1648) as well as the victory of absolutism (‘King by the Grace of God’), the influence of the 
churches declined and often degenerated into instruments of the state, which is hardly a good 
position for new thinking and development of doctrines of resistance.   
 
The doctrine of resistance as expressed by the Catholic Church, the Reformed Church and also the 
Protestant Church is characterised by the outmost restrain in the use of power – and even more so 
the Anabaptists. The fear of anarchy, civil war etc. is immanent. Thus the teaching of the churches 
has basically been in support of the state and of status quo until the end of the 19th century, where 
Christian inspired peace movements began to popup. One example is the inter-denominational 
Fellowship of Reconciliation, which was founded in 1914 in an attempt to stop the First World War 
by peaceful means, and consisting of British, German and later also American persons. 
 
 
Political thought and the right of resistance in the 16th and 17th Century 
 
 
When looking at the theological debate on resistance it is natural to use the denominations as way 
of categorising the various contributions. But his would hardly work, when looking at the secular 
discussion of resistance. In the history of political thought, philosophy and related sciences one may 
distil two archetype approaches or worldviews: an idealist or liberal approach, looking at man with 
positive eyes. Man is basically good and is able to be improved through education etc. The 
development of society in general is positive and progressive; theoretically it is possible to make a 
perfect society on earth and at the end of the process the state is hardly needed. Exponents are e.g. 
Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and Karl Marx . The other archetype is the ‘realist’ or 
conservative one. Man is selfish and egoistic and education etc. may help to cut away the worst 
edges but not alter the human nature fundamentally. History repeats itself and heaven is NOT a 
place on earth. Exponents are Aristotle, Machiavelli (1469-1527), Thomas Hobbes and Reinhold 
Niebuhr. These approaches to the human nature run through the Western history of ideas; some 
times in a pure form, but also in a variety of mixes. Not all Christian scholars belong to the ‘realist’ 
or rather pessimistic school, but there seem to be a ‘lumping’ together in that category, depending 
on how much emphasise is put on heredity sin etc. On the other hand one may find ‘non Christians’ 
in the realist group, like Edmond Burk, just as one may find Christian thinkers in the liberal corner, 
like John Locke. 
 
Machiavelli’s name is linked to ‘Il principe’ (The Prince) a manual on how to obtain and keep 
power. But he also wrote a book on republics and democracy (Discourses on Livy). Still, his 
understanding of the human as well as the possibilities for positive changes remained rather 
pessimistic, although he pleaded for republicanism i.e. democracy7. Already in book 1, chapter 5, in 
Discorsi,    
                                                 
7 ”Man kann nie einen Übelstand beseitigen, ohne dass ein anderer daraus entsteht.” (Discorsi, 1. Buch) and “Je 
mehr Macht die Menschen haben, um so mehr missbrauchen sie diese und werden übermütig.” (Geschichte von 
Florenz, 2. Buch) 
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Religiously the Dutch scholar and statesman Hugo Grotius (1583 - 1645) sided with the Arminians 
against the Calvinists in the question of the cause of free will and predestination. He did not believe, 
that war could be excluded between states, but his aim was to make it less brutal in general and to 
protect the civilians in particular.  
 
"I saw in the whole Christian world a license of fighting at which even barbarous nations might 
blush. Wars were begun on trifling pretexts or none at all, and carried on without any reference of 
law, Divine or human." 
--Hugo Grotius -- Prolegomena
 
In his De Jure Belli ac Pacis (‘On Law of War and Peace’) from 1625. Book 1, chapter 4 discusses 
the question of citizens’ right to resistance, or as he considers it: war against their ruler. 
 
“Among all good men one principle at any rate is established beyond controversy, that if the order 
should not be carried out.” 
 
Grotius accepts an extreamly limited right of active resistance and does not allow the ruler to be 
hurt, while leaning at e.g. David and Saul. Although David knew that king Saul wanted him dead 
and David had a bodyguard, David fled and tried to hide instead of standing up and defend himself. 
Also Grotius refers to the first generations of Christians who, although prosecuted did not resist.  
Resistance is only acceptable  
 
Uprising against a usurer is acceptable as he has come to power illegally 
 
He also quotes and agrees with Favonius’ statement “civil war is a worse evil than unlawful 
government” (Book 1 Chapter 4, XIX.2). 
 
Summing up Grotius is extremely restrictive in allowing resistance against a tyrant compared to 
Calvin and Luther; resistance is only acceptable as a very last resort before being killed, and even 
then Grotius opts for being killed… 
 
The general idea of Grotius is to maintain peace and tranquillity within the state, and not to  
 
Restricted self-defence is OK (Book 1, Chapter 4, VII.5-7) Refererer bl.a. til David 
(realist tradition) 
 
Thomas Hobbes (1588 - 1679 ) got accused for being an atheist, is an arctype realist. His famous 
statement to the Earl of Essex about society ‘it is a jungle out there’, as well as his characteristic of 
mankind as ‘Homo homine lupus’ tells that (1994 / 106):  
 
“For the laws of nature (as justice, equity, modesty, mercy, and (in sum) doing to others as we 
would be done to) of themselves, without the terror of some power to cause them to be observed, 
are contrary to our natural passions, that carry us to partiality, pride, revenge, and the like” 
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He was the farther of the idea of a social contract made by men living in a state of nature, and afraid 
of their lives. So much afraid that they were ready to give up parts of their freedom for the 
establishment of a commonwealth (1994 / 109): 
 
“The only way to erect such a common power as may be able to defend them from the invasion of 
foreigners and the injustice of one another, […], is to confer all their power and strength upon one 
man, or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, […] unto one will, which is as 
much as to say, to appoint a man or assembly of men to bear their person, and every one to own and 
acknowledge himself to be author of whatsoever he that so beareth their person shall act, […]”.  
 
The regent (Hobbes preferred monarchy) is above the law. If he is wise he will follow the natural 
law, and try to give good and fair laws, carrying about society etc. as it will secure stability wealth 
and minimise the risk of rebellion. But no one can prevent him from not looking after the society 
and pursue egoistic goals. I agree with Colette Kouadio’s summery that:  
 
“Il faut bien voir qu'aux yeux de Hobbes le droit de résistance est purement et simplement exclu. Le 
souverain, même s'il use de la dernière violence, ne peut rien faire contre l'intérêt du peuple 
puisqu'il le sort de la pire des situations qui soit : l'état de nature. Toute révolte risque de faire 
réapparaître cet état de nature. Or, si "à l'état de nature l'homme est un loup pour l'homme, à l'état 
social l'homme est un dieu pour l'homme". Certes si le pouvoir était à ce point arbitraire qu'il 
mettrait en péril la vie de ses sujets, ceux-ci peuvent se défendre (c'est en effet pour se préserver 
qu'ils ont admis le contrat) mais cela ne signifie pas qu'il y ait droit à la résistance. Le pouvoir est 
absolu parce que c'est le garant de sa stabilité. Cela ne signifie pas qu'il soit nécessairement 
arbitraire ou despotique.” 
 
Thus even in Hobbes’ universe man has a limited right to resist the regent, namely the one of self 
defence8.  
 
John Locke (1632 - 1704), who sympathised with the Armenians (Gough 1956/ix), was basically a 
Whig but followed Augustine, and the other protestant thinkers of the reformation, when writing his 
‘The Second Treatise of Government’ in 1690. In chapter 18 ‘On Tyranny’ he deals with the 
question of resistance. He begins be defining tyranny as “[…] the exercise of power beyond right, 
which nobody can have a right to. And this is making use of the power any one has in his hand, not 
for the good of those who are under it, but for his own private separate advantage” (Lock 
1956/100). To Locke the regent is a subject to the law, contrary to Hobbes. Thus his answer to the 
question whether resistance is acceptable is stringent (1956/102):  
  
“To this I answer, that force is to be opposed to nothing but to unjust and unlawful force; whoever 
makes any opposition in any other case draws on himself a just condemnation both from God and 
man, […]” 
 
Such were the theoretical basis up to the middle of the 18th century. Only a very limited right to 
resist the sovereign was accepted, and that was equally the case whether the scholar belonged to the 
idealist or realist tradition. The last half of the 18th century saw two great revolutions: the American 
and the French. 
 
                                                 
8 Thomas S. Schrock 1991 gives an in-depth analysis of  ‘The Right to Punish and Resist Punishment in Hobbes’s 
Leviathan. 
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The Great Revolutions 
An important argument for a revolution in America was delivered by Thomas Painer (1737-1809), a 
broke Englishman whom Benjamin Franklin got to know and send to Philadelphia. His great 
contribution was the pamphlet ‘Common Sense’ from 1776. 
 
He begins his pamphlet by making the important distinction between society and government 
(Section I): 
 
“SOME writers have so confounded society with government, as to leave little or no distinction 
between them; whereas they are not only different, but have different origins. Society is produced 
by our wants, and government by wickedness; the former promotes our happiness positively by 
uniting our affections, the latter negatively by restraining our vices. The one encourages intercourse, 
the other creates distinctions. The first is a patron, the last a punisher 
 
“Society in every state is a blessing, but government even in its best state is but a necessary evil; in 
its worst state an intolerable one; for when we suffer, or are exposed to the same miseries by a 
government, which we might expect in a country without government, our calamity is heightened by 
reflecting that we furnish the means by which we suffer. Government, like dress, is the badge of lost 
innocence; […]” 
 
As one does need a government, then its source of legitimacy and sovereignty stems from the 
majority of the people. He goes on arguing, that the British constitution has cemented tyranny, and 
that the America suffers economically from the connection (section III): 
 
“I have heard it asserted by some, that as America hath flourished under her former connexion with 
Great-Britain, that the same connexion is necessary towards her future happiness, and will always 
have the same effect. Nothing can be more fallacious than this kind of argument. We may as well 
assert that because a child has thrived upon milk, that it is never to have meat, or that the first 
twenty years of our lives is to become a precedent for the next twenty. But even this is admitting 
more than is true, for I answer roundly, that America would have flourished as much, and probably 
much more, had no European power had any thing to do with her. The commerce, by which she 
hath enriched herself are the necessaries of life, and will always have a market while eating is the 
custom of Europe.” 
 
Consequently he suggests an independent America under a president and a continental congress. 
Also one should remember that the American Revolution, was an uprising of citizens outside the 
mainland, and was basically legitimized through the claim of being deprived from democratic right 
(‘No taxation without representation’) as well as general exploitation from the mother country. In 
other words the sovereign did not obey the laws of the country, and an uprising was legitimate in a 
Lockeian sense. 
 
The French Revolution was of a different kind. It took place in the mother country and its aim was 
to transform the existing system of government and to reform the whole society: 
In the preamble of the Declaration of the Rights of Man, as approved by the National Assembly of 
France, August 26, 1789 the reason for the change is given: 
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“The representatives of the French people, organized as a National Assembly, believing that the 
ignorance, neglect, or contempt of the rights of man are the sole cause of public calamities and of 
the corruption of governments, have determined to set forth in a solemn declaration the natural, 
unalienable, and sacred rights of man, in order that this declaration, being constantly before all the 
members of the Social body, shall remind them continually of their rights and duties; in order that 
the acts of the legislative power, as well as those of the executive power, may be compared at any 
moment with the objects and purposes of all political institutions and may thus be more respected, 
and, lastly, in order that the grievances of the citizens, based hereafter upon simple and 
incontestable principles, shall tend to the maintenance of the constitution and redound to the 
happiness of all.” 
 
The concrete background for the French Revolution was a desolate economy, large unemployment, 
monopolies and a rigid society, which divided the citizens in three categories: the clergy, the 
nobility and the commoners. The ideological or philosophical background was the enlightenment 
and its belief in the possibilities of the future. Among many sources of inspiration were John Lock 
and Charles-Louis de Secondat Montesquieu (1689 - 1755). 
 
The French minister of Finance Jacques Necker, had tried to reform the finances, but got stopped bt 
the regional parliaments. This prompted Abbé Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès (1748 – 1836) to write the 
single most influential pamphlet on the situation in France titled ‘Qu’est-ce que le tiers état?’ (What 
is the third state?). He begins his pamphlet thus: 
 
”The plan of this book is fairly simple. We must ask ourselves three questions. 
 
1. What is the Third State? Everything. 
 
2. What has it been until now in the political order? Nothing. 
 
3. What does it want to be? Something.... 
 
[and ends]: 
 
The Third Estate embraces then all that which belongs to the nation; and all that which is not the 
Third Estate, cannot be regarded as being of the nation.” 
 
In his pamphlet Sieyès criticises the privileges of the nobility and argues that they are a burden 
upon the state and that the whole system of privileges prevents progress, and he goes on: 
 
“In the first place, it is not possible in the number of all the elementary parts of a nation to find a 
place for the caste of nobles. I know that there are individuals in great number whom infirmities, 
incapacity, incurable laziness, or the weight of bad habits render strangers tot eh labors of society. 
The exception and the abuse are everywhere found beside the rule. But it will be admitted that he 
less there are of these abuses, the better it will be for the State. The worst possible arrangement of 
all would be where not alone isolated individuals, but a whole class of citizens should take pride in 
remaining motionless in the midst of the general movement, and should consume the best part of 
the product without bearing any part in its production. Such a class is surely estranged to the nation 
by its indolence.” 
 
 11
To Sieyès the nation is the commoners, the Third Estate: 
“The Third Estate embraces then all that which belongs to the nation; and all that which is not the 
Third Estate, cannot be regarded as being of the nation.  
What is the Third Estate?  
It is the whole.” 
Sieyès actively participated in the writing of the ‘Declaration of the Rights of Man’ in which art. 2 
is especially noteworthy in this context as it clearly expresses a right of resistance (slightely ironic 
considering the regime of terror and later the Napoleonic dictatorship which were to follow): 
“2. The aim of all political association is the preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of 
man. These rights are liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression. “ 
With its belief in enlightenment, rationality of man, in short ‘progress’,  as well as the right to 
oppose and resist oppression, the fundamental texts of the revolution places it clearly in the ‘liberal’ 
tradition. 
Taking yet another leap in history, the idealist or liberal worldview concerning resistance is 
enhanced to further. For Karl Marx (1818 – 1883) and Friederich Engels (1820 – 1895) history was 
one long series of fights (Communist Manifesto): 
“The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles.  
Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, in a word, 
oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, 
now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of 
society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes.” 
But they were positive towards progress both concerning technology, society and education. 
Capitalists’ unjust and brutal treatment of the proletariat would lead to the proletarians uniting and 
fighting the bourgeoisie in their own countries, then united. The aim would be a society without 
classes and without the right of proporty (Communist Manifesto):  
 “The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their ends can 
be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions. Let the ruling classes 
tremble at a Communistic revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They 
have a world to win.  
Working Men of All Countries, Unite!”  
 
Resistance against the oppressor was, according to Marx & Engels, not only a possibility or an 
obligation; it was natural.9  
                                                 
9  Daniel Bensaïd has written a communist analysis of the question of  resistance ‘Theses of resistance ‘ (2004) 
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Conclusion: 
The question of resistance was important from the very beginning of the Church in the first 
centuries AC. As the Christians did not have any instruments of power at their disposal, the 
question was whether to resist passively or not at all. The first prosecutions showed us that both 
options were chosen.  
 
of minor interest in the first centuries AC, as the Christians  
  
The French Revolution changes the concept of resistance within the liberal or idealistic worldview. 
From laying an emphasise on stability in the society, it moves towards ‘justice’. But it still 
embraces the whole range from pacifism to revolution. In other words from non-resistance to active 
resistance. The realist worldview  still emphasises stability and looks at resistance with suspicion, 
but it recognises it as a last way out.  
Comparing to the churches present view of resistance  
Where as the churches still defend a limited right to resistance, especially the liberal or idealistic 
world view within political thought has developed dramatically since the 18th century. The classical 
writers such as Grotius, Hobbes and Loche in the 16th and 17th century still defended the restricted 
right to resistance, the two realists Hobbes and Grotius the strictest, the idealist or liberal Loche less 
so, Enlightenment and increasing secularisation influenced on political thought of the 18th and 19th 
century.  
 
 
Although Grotius was somewhat conservative in his views, his ideas on war, 
conquest, and the law of nature continued to be revered and expanded by more 
liberal philosophers like John Locke in his Two Treatises on Civil Government 
(1689). Locke agrees with Grotius in using the analytical device of a state of nature 
that exists before civil government and in the general claim that might does not 
make right as well as the claim that just wars aim to preserve rights. 
 
In feudal Europe a right of resistance was accepted, as the feudal system was build on a contractual 
relationship; if the king did not fulfil his obligations, his vassals were allowed to rebel. 
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The rights of resistance have clearly developed much more within the political thought than within 
the theological. 
 
But the theological discussion of a right of resistance has been clearly influenced by the political 
circumstances. Both e.g. Luther and Calvin needed to create a right of resistance, to secure their 
followers survival during the Reformation. 
 
 
 
 
 
On the other hand, the very liberal Emanuel Kant, a true child of the Enlightenment is told to have 
cried out: ‘Das Volk hat nichts zu tun als zu gehorchen!, but he was Preussian10’. 
 
(E.g. Althusius, Grotius, Hobbes, Locke, Burke, Kant (Das Volk hat nichts zu tun als zu 
gehorchen)) 
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Captain: 
Grotius discusses war as being a mode of protecting rights and punishing wrongs. It is a mode of 
judicial procedures. Although war was considered a "necessary evil," it needed to be regulated. The 
"just war," in the eyes of Grotius, is a war to obtain a right. 
Grotius discusses three methods of for settling a dispute peacefully. The first is conference and 
negotiation amongst two rivals or contestants. The second method is called compromise, which is a 
settlement in which each side gives up some demands or makes concessions. The third is that of 
single combat or choosing by lot. Grotius believed that it is sometimes better to renounce rights 
than to try and enforce them. When it comes to bargaining and mediation he holds that for any of 
the three methods listed above, it is of extreme importance to select a judge with character and 
decency. Grotius discusses these methods of achieving peace to ultimately obtain some form of 
justice. He says, "For justice brings peace of conscience, while injustice causes torment and 
anguish... Justice is approved, and injustice condemned, by the common agreement of good men." 
(Prolegomena) 
Radical Calvinism and the Natural Right of Resistance, January 2, 2006 
Reviewer: Robert A. Williams "libertarian" (Oberlin, OH United States) - See all my reviews 
    
Out of the religious wars between the Protestants and the Catholic Church emerged a 
suprisingly modern theory of individual natural rights and justified violent resistance to 
authority. Using ancient Roman private law concepts to justify rebellion against tyrants, 
Radical Calvinists such as John Ponet, Christopher Goodman, George Buchanan - all of 
Scotland and England, contributed, while Francois Hotman, Theodore Beza and Mornay of 
France transformed an essentially religious duty to resist into a secular, moral, and even 
natural, right of resistance.  
 
Prior to 1530, Skinner says that Lutherans and Calvinists followed a "theory of passive political 
obedience" and "their leaders were almost wholly unprepared to defend their Church". Calvin 
thought, to oversimplify a bit, that all rulers were ordained by God, good or bad, and that 
man, as God's subjects, must endure the Divine Plan. Luther restated his position in 1530 - "It 
is in no way proper for anyone who wants to be a Christian to stand up against the authority of 
his government, regardless of whether that government acts rightly or wrongly".  
 
However, a few months later, the Catholics had outlawed the Lutherans (Diet of 1530) and 
then Gregory Bruck, Chancellor to John of Saxony, wrote his private-law theory of resistance 
"Whether it is lawful to resist a judge who is proceeding unlawfully". Bruck took the view that 
"The Emperor is seeking to impose his judgement in matters of faith" where he "has absolutely 
no jurisdiction at all". Then in October, as a result of a meeting at the Palace of Torgau, Luther 
capitulated - "until now we have taught absolutely not to resist the governing authority 
[because] . . . we did not know that the governing authority's law itself grants the right of 
armed resistance".  
 
Skinner says "after the immediate crisis had passed, the Lutherans not only continued to 
endorse the private-law theory of resistance, but even began to revise and develop it", 
including Luther. Here Luther smacked counter to Calvin by stating in 1539 that "The Emperor 
is head of the body of the political realm", and as such is "a private man to whom political 
power is granted for the defence of the realm". The Lutherans also developed a constitutional 
theory of resistance in that lesser politicos are equally ordained by God and thus can 
outnumber an unrighteous superior, but this theory did not develop into a natural right of 
resistance.  
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However, Skinner says "the basic argument in favour of resistance advanced by the Calvinists 
(during the late 1540s) . . . was largely a repetition of the Lutheran constitutonal theory". He 
adds "When we turn, however, from the continental leaders of Calvinism to the more 
revolutionary protagonists of the movement in England, we find a very different situation . . . 
the Scots and English revolutionaries . . . began to exploit the more individualistic and radically 
populist implications of the private-law argument".  
 
Ponet and Goodman abandoned "the cardinal Augustinian assumption that, even if our rulers 
fail to discharge the duties of their offices, they must still be regarded as powers ordained of 
God". Goodman used Conciliar thinking to bring him to the conclusion that "it is lawful for the 
people, yea it is their duty, to do it themselves", thereby ensuring that they "cut off every 
rotten member" and to impose the law of God "as well upon their own rulers and magistrates 
as upon others of their brethren". Goodman thought God would punish anyone who did not 
carry out their duty, and armed thus, Calvinists revolted successfully from the Catholics.  
 
At this point in history, "the radical Calvinists of the 1530s have no such concept of political 
resistance as a right" apart from a religious duty. This thinking was later accomplished "by the 
Huguenots during the French religious wars in the second half of the sixteenth century".  
 
Skinner says "Since [the Huguenots]. . . were in a considerable minority, they could scarcely 
hope to invoke the available Calvinist theory of revolution, and demand . . . that the whole 
body of the godly people should rise up against the congregation of Satan in order to establish 
the congregation of Christ. They needed to develop a revolutionary ideology capable of 
appealing . . . to the various Catholic malcontents".  
 
The French monarchy "had rendered itself so unpopular in the first half of the sixteenth 
century", that the Huguenots sought to appeal to the general discontent. The Huguenot 
monarchomachs (those who argued for the right and/or duty of subjects to resist unjust 
rulers), best exemplified by Francois Hotman's "Franco-Gallia"(1573), concentrated on 
grounding their arguments on real or presumed historical precedents in French laws and 
institutions resulting in a rather narrowly legal and historical argument. Their conclusions and 
implications were limited to promoting specific liberties of various privileged orders in French 
society.  
 
Skinner says "The essence of the Huguenot case is thus that the magistrates and 
representatives of the people have the moral right to resist tyrannical government by force, a 
right which is founded on the prior and natural right of the sovereign people to treat the 
commonwealth as a means for securing and improving their own welfare". He concludes that 
"with Beza, Mornay and their followers, the idea that the preservation of religious uniformity 
constitutes the sole possible grounds for legitimate resistance is finally abandoned. The result 
is a fully political theory of revolution, founded on a recognisably modern, secularised thesis 
about the natural rights and original sovereignty of the people".  
 
In summary, Skinners says that Radical Calvinism developed a secular, moral, and natural 
right of resistance. Yet it seems to me that they did so grudgingly and never really fully 
grasped natural law or natural rights. J.W. Allen noted in his "A History of Political Thought in 
the Sixteenth Century", p314, that the language of universal natural rights "served no 
Huguenot purpose. It served, in truth, no purpose at all at the time, though, one day, it might 
come to do so". 
 
 
The Right To Keep and Bear Firearms; Gerry A. Shade, 
http://209.85.135.104/search?q=cache:vWVZgViiJI0J:www.firearmsandliberty.com/papers-
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shade/TheRightToKeepandBearArms.PDF+Machiavelli+right+to+resist&hl=da&gl=dk&ct=clnk&
cd=4 
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